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ABSTRACT 
 
Heidi Mawby: Assessing the Role of the United States and the European Union in 
Democracy Promotion in Ukraine 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova) 
 
 
Both the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) are involved in 
democracy promotion efforts across the world.  This thesis examines how each employs 
its own approach for doing so, and how effective these approaches have been during two 
different phases of Ukrainian democracy.  Although the approaches are complementary 
and both play a positive role for democracy in Ukraine, they have each been more 
effective in different phases.  During Ukraine’s latest transition phase, known as the 
Orange Revolution, the US “bottom-up approach,” with its focus on free and fair 
elections as well as civil society, was more effective in helping the Ukrainians overcome 
their corrupt regime.  The EU, with its “top-down” and integrative approach, is currently 
playing a more influential role in helping Ukraine consolidate its democratic gains.   
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Introduction 
 
For two major world actors, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), 
democracy promotion plays a central role in foreign policy rhetoric and actions.  Each 
spends approximately $1.5 billion a year on such programs (McFaul, 2007), and both are 
currently investing enormous financial and technical resources around the globe in this 
pursuit.  Although their goals are the same, their methods and approaches for 
encouraging democracy abroad vary considerably.  
Encouraging democracy in the post-Soviet states situated between the eastern 
border of the EU and Russia is a priority for both.  These are comparatively new states 
with fragile democracies.  They are threatened not only by periodic domestic turmoil but 
also remain fairly dependent on the Russian Federation for energy and trade, and carry a 
legacy of authoritarianism from the Cold War period.  
In this thesis, I will examine exactly how the United States and the European 
Union work to promote democracy in this region.  Why and how do these strategies 
differ, and has one been more effective than another?  I will investigate the case of 
Ukraine in order to uncover the effects of US and EU influence on two phases of 
Ukrainian democracy.  The first is Ukraine’s most recent moment of regime change or 
transition, known as the Orange Revolution which occurred in late 2004.  The second 
phase is the period of consolidation which has succeeded it.     
I argue that both the US and EU have had a positive influence on Ukrainian 
democracy in both phases.  However, the US was more involved in the Orange 
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Revolution, whereas the EU plays more influential role in the current consolidation 
phase, and will likely continue to do so.  
A comparison of the US and EU approaches to democracy promotion within a 
specific country is helpful because it demonstrates the strengths and weakness of each 
approach.  It can also indicate how the approaches overlap, complement or conflict with 
one another, and can learn from one another.  Ideally the approaches will complement 
one another without too much overlap.   
Ukraine is an ideal case study in this region both because of its regional 
importance and internal dynamics.  It is a major actor in Eastern Europe because it 
controls the major port of the Black Sea, it is a transit country for energy supplies to 
Europe, and because of its relations with neighbors such as Moldova and Belarus.  But it 
is also politically divided, struggling with corruption and human rights violations, and 
must carefully balance its policies with the West as well as Russia.  For all of these 
reasons, the US and EU are committed to democracy’s success in Ukraine.  
Understanding how and why democracy promotion efforts here have worked can help 
shape strategies for other post-Communist states as well as for other regions.    
The rest of this thesis will be organized in the following way: first, I have to 
answer the broader question: “Why and how are the US and EU democracy promotion 
approaches in Ukraine different?”  This will require an explanation of the history and 
development of democracy promotion efforts by both actors, followed by their 
characteristics.  In this first section, I will establish that the US approach is generally 
designed to bring about a revolution, whereas the long-term nature and integrative aspect 
of the European approach is designed to help consolidate a democracy.  Then I will turn 
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to Ukraine, and give a brief overview of its democratic trajectory from independence 
until today.   
Building upon this knowledge, in the second part of this thesis I will answer the 
question, “How effective have each of these two approaches been in the Ukraine?”  
Starting with the factors that led to the Orange Revolution, I will describe how US and 
EU efforts directly or indirectly enabled domestic actors to topple the corrupt regime.  I 
will demonstrate that although both played an important role, the US overall played a 
stronger role during the Revolution through its election-related activities and civil society 
support, as well its more forceful criticism of the regime.   
To determine which actor plays a larger role in the current stage of democratic 
consolidation, I will look at their political and economic influences on Ukraine, and how 
both are viewed by elites and the population.  In addition, I will assess the potential role 
that each actor can play in the future.  Although both actors are effective in this context, I 
will argue that through the offer for deeper integration, the EU does play a larger role and 
will likely continue to do so.  
The US and the EU do not carry out democracy promotion efforts in a vacuum, 
however, and therefore I will also briefly examine two other major external actors who 
play an influential role on Ukrainian democracy, Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  Especially in light of this summer’s conflict between Georgia and 
Russia, many fear that Russia is looking to reassert its control over the former Soviet 
region, and that its next “target” for destabilization is Ukraine.  I will argue, however, 
that these fears are exaggerated and that Ukraine is likely to continue to consolidate 
democracy.  
 4 
In the concluding section of this thesis, I will review how each approach has been 
useful to democracy in Ukraine, and I will speculate on how successful each one is likely 
to be in the future.  In addition to offering some suggestions for improvement to both 
actors, I will also consider to what extent their efforts are complementary. 
 
  
 
 
 
I. Democracy Promotion Approaches of US and EU: History, 
Characteristics, and Role in the Ukraine 
 
Within democracy studies, the role which external actors can play in helping to 
establish a democracy is a neglected topic, for both theoretical and practical reasons.  
Theoretically, the prevailing consensus within the field focuses on the role of internal 
actors and conditions, and insists that the role of external actors is at the best marginal.  
In a practical sense, measuring the actual results of democracy promotion efforts is an 
“overwhelming, if not impossible task,” according to a report by the National 
Endowment for Democracy (Epstein, Serafina & Miko, 2007, p.17). 
Despite these hurdles, however, there is evidence that democracy promotion can 
be effective, and much more research needs to be done to understand how, when, and 
why these efforts can make an impact. This is necessary not only for the field of 
democracy studies itself, but for a very practical reason as well- democracy promotion is 
now a major foreign policy goal of some international actors.  These may spend 
substantial time and financial resources to encourage countries along their path to 
democracy, and research needs to ensure that these efforts yield results and are not 
counter-productive. 
Laurence Whitehead, in the book Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives, was one of the first to break with the accepted opinion that 
external actors played little to no role in democratic developments within a country.  He 
detailed the different background and effects of the US and the (then) EC democracy 
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promotion efforts in Eastern Europe and in Latin America, and drew general distinctions 
between the two approaches.  Interestingly, although his 1986 piece pre-dated the fall of 
communism, the existence of the European Union and its enlargement process, as well as 
the Iraq War, his analysis is still extremely relevant today.   
It is difficult to precisely define how exactly the “US” or “EU” carries out 
democracy promotion, because there is a labyrinth of institutions, programs and funds 
involved in both actors’ work.  There are NGO (non-governmental institutions), civil 
society initiatives, government-funded foundations (such as the German political 
foundations) as well as privately-funded run organizations, such as the Soros Foundation, 
among many others.  In this thesis, I primarily focus on official government programs 
and actions by the United States and the European Union, as more private initiatives are 
involved on nearly every level with a range of goals. 
Above all, it is important to remember that a democracy cannot take root without 
active and willing participation by the individual country, and domestic actors play the 
primary role in establishing or steering democracy.  At best, external actors can play a 
secondary role. 
In order to understand how the US and the EU’s general approach to democracy 
promotion efforts differ, this section will begin with a review of their individual 
development of democracy promotion.  A general description and assessment of these 
two approaches will follow.  Finally turning to Ukraine, I will briefly outline its steps 
towards democracy since the collapse of the Soviet Union.   
 
History of Democracy Promotion in US and Europe 
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US 
American and European democracy promotion approaches have grown from two 
very different histories and motives.  The American experience has a longer history, and 
has from the beginning has often been associated with overthrowing an illiberal regime 
through violent means and helping build democracy in the aftermath.    
US history in democracy promotion began with involvement in Spanish-
American War in 1898, during which the ideal of Manifest Destiny played a large role.  It 
was seen as a duty to export the American ideals and institutions of freedom (Whitehead, 
1986), even through military means, if necessary.  This tendency to employ 
democratization efforts after a military intervention only increased over time and with 
experience, and ultimately became a “pattern of American foreign policy” (Kneuer, 2007, 
p.17). 
Democracy became an explicit part of the foreign policy rhetoric of many US 
presidents.  President Woodrow Wilson led the country into the First World War in order 
“to make the world safe for democracy” (Whitehead, 1986, p. 4).  President Franklin 
Roosevelt called for America to become the “arsenal of democracy” in December 1940, 
before the US entered World War II. 
In the wake of World War II, Germany and Japan become examples of “guided 
democracies” which were led to democracy after a complete military defeat.  It was the 
first time that the US used the military to support “rapid and fundamental societal 
transformation” (Dobbins et al, 2003, p.xiii).  It was during this era that the US began to 
see democracy as a foreign policy objective. At America’s urging, it was mentioned in 
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many international treaties, such as the Truman Doctrine, the Final Act of Bogotá of the 
Organization of American States, and of course in the NATO treaty.   
Democracy promotion obviously became a pivotal US goal during the Cold War.  
President John F. Kennedy engaged in its use because he “believed…that the United 
States had a unique capacity, as well as the duty or even destiny, to do good in the world” 
(Carothers, 1999, p.20).  Unfortunately during this time, democracy promotion as an 
ideal was often in conflict with the preoccupation of countering the Communism’s 
spread.  The legitimacy of this policy suffered when the US administration supported 
dictators in Latin America or in the Middle East. 
After the Cold War, the US was the only remaining world superpower.  The lack 
of archenemy or a future mission was lacking, known as a so-called “missionary gap.”  
President William Clinton’s enlargement doctrine partially filled this gap.  In the 
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, his administration declared 
that democracy promotion should be a main objective of US foreign policy in order to 
ensure peace, security and human rights (Epstein et al, 2007, p.8).  His administration 
also frequently pointed out that democracies do not go to war against one another; his 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake stated that: “The successor to a doctrine of 
containment must be a strategy of enlargement…of the world’s free community…We 
must counter the aggression- and support the liberalization- of states hostile to 
democracy” (Schraeder, 2002, p.115). 
Under the presidency of George W. Bush, the democracy promotion ideology, 
even through military means, has reached its pinnacle.  After September 11, the fight 
against terrorism has become the primary objective of the administration, which “asserts 
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that democracy promotion is a long-term antidote to terrorism” (Epstein et al, 2007, p.8).  
US-led invasions into Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 exemplify the 
administration’s firm belief in exporting democracy for national security.  In 2007, 
President Bush affirmed that “the ideas and interests that led America to help the 
Japanese turn defeat into democracy are the same that lead us to remain engaged in 
Afghanistan and Iraq” (“Bush: history will prove,” 2007). 
In perhaps the most ambitious theory related to democracy promotion, many in 
the Bush administration believed that the Iraq invasion would unleash a wave of 
democracy in the Middle East.  According to this theory, toppling Saddam Hussein 
would allow the people to rise up and establish a free and democratic system of 
government.  This was meant to set a powerful example for other countries in the region, 
and encourage people in the Middle East to demand democracy.  This “democratic 
dominos” theory was expressed by former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, 
who said that Iraq would “cast a very large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran, across 
the whole Arab world” (Reynolds, 2003).   
A lack of clear success in Afghanistan and Iraq might have dispelled such 
ambitious and idealistic plans for democracy promotion, and unfortunately many in the 
international community regard “democracy promotion” as synonymous with American 
use of military might.  However, experts in the field defend democracy promotion as an 
essential US foreign policy objective, as long as appropriate lessons from recent 
experiences are taken to heart (Carothers, 2006). 
 
EU 
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The EU itself is a rather new international actor, and as such it does not have such 
a long history of promoting democracy beyond its borders.  But in the wake of World 
War II, democratic Western Europe nations desired stability and democracy in their 
geographic neighborhood.  Unable and unprepared to use military strength (unlike the 
US); they developed a more peaceful incentives-based approach to dealing with anti-
democratic regimes in neighboring countries (Whitehead, 1986).   They developed a 
long-term approach which offered monetary, political and societal incentives in exchange 
for reform.  This was achieved by creating certain institutions which held privileges and 
expanding membership only to countries which had met certain criteria. 
The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 by ten Western European countries.  
This body “not only committed all its members to the rule of law, human rights, and 
fundamental freedoms, but … provided for the suspension of member governments who 
violated these precepts” (Whitehead, 1986, p.5).  Out of this core group grew a treaty 
which began the process of European integration.   
The Treaty of Rome in 1957, which created European Economic Community 
(EEC), contained no explicit language requiring democracy (Whitehead, 1986).  
However, in 1962, as Franco’s Spain wished to join the EEC, a group of western 
European Socialists were determined to keep them out because of political reasons.  They 
commissioned the Birkelbach Report, which laid out the EEC’s membership condition: 
“Only States which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect 
for fundamental rights and freedoms can become members of our Community” 
(Whitehead, 1986, p.21).   
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Although primarily directly against Spain, this new criteria also made it 
impossible for Portugal and Greece to join the newly established Community.  All three 
were finally able to do so in the mid-1970s, after democracy was finally established in 
these countries.  Although it is not clear that that democracy finally won out due to this 
refusal, it added to the pressure that the authoritarian governments faced (Kneuer, 2007).  
This therefore established the approach of withholding economic and political benefits 
from a country until they themselves had made democratic reforms, as opposed to the 
American approach of using military force.   
As the EEC grew into the European Union, the lessons from southern Europe 
were kept in mind, and after the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, many East 
Central European countries immediately turned towards the European Union for support 
and for entry reassurances.  In the next section, I will explain how the European Union 
was able to use this approach to successfully encourage many of these countries on their 
paths to consolidated democracies.   
 
Two Different Approaches: Characteristics, Methods, and Advantages and 
Disadvantages 
 
As I have described in the previous section, the US and the EU have developed 
two different approaches for promoting democracy abroad due to their different histories 
and challenges.  In this section, I will explain the characteristics of each approach and 
give examples their programs and objectives.  Finally, I will give a brief overview of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach. 
 
US 
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The US democracy promotion approach can be summed up with the following: 
“topple the leader, pull down his statue, and let civil society take over” (Kopstein, 2006, 
p.2).  According to this model, quickly after the old regime has been deposed (possibly 
through violent means), elections should be held.  Through these elections, the will of the 
people will be expressed, and this allows democracy to grow from the bottom up. 
The two key elements of this “bottom-up” (Kopstein, 2006) approach are free and 
fair elections and a strong civil society.    This is where the bulk of US financial aid and 
effort is spent, and although the US employs a multitude of institutions to carry out its 
democracy promotion efforts, they primarily focus on these two objectives.  In this 
model, civil society is one that is well-informed politically and is able to organize, and 
will be able to elect reformers and continue to do so. 
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created in 1983 to 
coordinate the efforts of all the political parties, unions, and business organizations in the 
field of democracy promotion abroad (Whitehead, 1986).  The two main American 
political parties have their own organizations, the International Republican Institute (IRI) 
and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), which are financed through government and 
private funds.  Both of these institutes are involved in the Ukraine, with almost identical 
priorities.  Both promote the development of political parties, civil society, election 
monitoring and parliamentary development (see sites of both institutions in 
bibliography).   
Further US government support comes in the form of the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID).  This institution’s goal is to “increase citizens’ 
participation in elections and to improve democratic governance by strengthening 
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government institutions and various civil society organizations” (USAID website).  In the 
Ukraine, for instance, its project for civil society, UCAN, supports hundreds of NGOs.  
Two further projects aid democracy in the Ukraine.  Since 1992 Ukraine has been 
a major recipient for the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and 
Open Markets (FREEDOM) Act.  Ukraine has received three billion US dollars from this 
program, primarily to “promote political and economic reform and to address urgent 
humanitarian needs” (US State Department website).  Since 2006, Ukraine has also had a 
“Threshold Program” treaty through the program Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC).  This program is targeted to receive $45 million, and its goals are to fight 
corruption through civil society promotion and reform of the judicial branch. 
Despite the fragmented nature of this aid, it is clear that American democracy 
promotion efforts in the Ukraine focus on elections and related activities.  While the US 
spent $28 million promoting democracy in the Ukraine in 2005 here (Brinkely, 2004), it 
spent more than $18 million on election-related programs alone in 2003-2004 (McFaul, 
2007).  The other main focus of aid is building civil society.   
 
EU 
The European approach to democracy promotion in this region is more long-term 
in its view, and has in fact presided over “the most successful democracy promotion 
program ever implemented by an international actor” (Ekiert et al, 2007).  It has done this 
through its unique process of integration and enlargement.  By offering membership in 
return for substantial reforms, it has anchored countries to a democratic path.  Because 
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this approach relies on countries adopting these reforms at the government level and 
offering institutional support, this is known as a “top-down approach.”   
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, East Central European countries such 
as Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia turned towards the European Union in their 
quest for economic prosperity and in order to “return to Europe.”  Eight new members 
from East Central Europe were finally able to join the EU in 2004, followed by Romania 
and Bulgaria in 2007.  Before they could do so, however, they were required to undergo a 
vetting process which has asked they undertake major reforms in democracy.  The EU 
was able to require this by using conditionality and exerting passive and active leverage 
over these countries.   
Before a country becomes an official candidate for membership, the EU exerts 
what Dr. Milada Vachudova terms “passive leverage” over the country in transition.  This 
means that because the political and economic benefits of joining the EU are so great, and 
the cost of exclusion is also so high, the EU is able to exert pressure on the country in 
transition to reform.   
Active leverage is comprised by the actual requirements the EU set up for 
membership, and refers to the Copenhagen criteria and the aquis communitaire.  In 1993, 
a set of standard entry requirements was settled upon for new members at the 
Copenhagen Summit.  These became known as the Copenhagen criteria, and in order to 
join the Union, they demand: 
“democratic stability, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of 
minorities…” as well as “the existence of a functioning market economy…and 
the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
aims of the political, economic union” (Vachudova 2005, p.96). 
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In addition, countries wishing to join must sign up for the aquis communitaire, or 
the approximately 800,000 pages of laws and obligations that are needed to fulfill 
compatibility with EU laws and institutions.  These are organized into thirty-one 
chapters, all of which take years for a country to adopt.  In order to help prospective 
members achieve their targets, the EU offers financial transfers, technical training and 
exchanges.  There are also regular reviews that detail their progress in thorough reports.   
These requirements were non-negotiable for the aspiring members, and there was 
clear-cut conditionality involved: if the countries made the reforms and met the 
requirements, they would be awarded with membership.  This process was therefore 
extremely transparent and demanded long-term engagement from both the new members 
as well as from the EU.  It also relied on elites to lead reforms from the top and adopt EU 
policies which will then affect practices and trickle down to the rest of the country, 
known as a top-down approach.  
On the eastern borders of the expanded EU, there are other countries struggling 
for democracy and which are interested in EU integration. However, due to internal 
political reasons, the EU enlargement is currently on hold, and future membership offers 
are likely to be difficult to obtain in the near future.  The EU has now developed the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as its main instrument to encourage democracy in 
its immediate periphery.  Ukraine is one of deal with these countries included in the new 
ENP, and in Part II I will go over its effect on Ukraine further. 
The ENP is composed of bilateral relationships between the EU and six countries 
in Eastern Europe as well as in ten Mediterranean countries.  The program began in 2004, 
after the last big round of enlargement.  Although it was clear that further enlargement 
 16 
was far off, the EU realized that its technique of enlargement was the best way to 
promote democracy.  It also did not want future possible members to be neglected until 
they were finally in a position to offer membership.   Thus the ENP is a compromise “to 
remove lines of division and to render the dichotomy ‘EU accession: yes or no’ less 
dramatic” (Lippert, 2008, p. 6).   
The ENP clearly tries to emulate the successful components of the enlargement 
process (Kelley, 2006, p.49).  It retains the principle of conditionality, for example, 
although in a weaker and more flexible form (Kelley, 2006, p.35).  In its action plans 
(which cover three to five years), it requires reforms from neighboring countries in return 
for increasing incentives from the EU.  Action plans are tailored to each neighboring 
country’s specific needs and requirements.  Reforms required are both general and 
specific, and include political, social and economic aspects (Grant, 2006).  The incentives 
listed are generally: “a stake in the EU’s internal market, opportunities to participate 
progressively in EU policies and programs, reduction of trade barriers, increased 
financial support, participation in cultural and exchange programs, and deepening 
economic and political relations” (Kelley, 2006, p.37). 
Although in its founding document the ENP only mentions democracy in a 
footnote (Beichelt, 2007), the ENP’s goal is to promote democracy through political 
stability, economic development and human rights by encouraging closer ties with the 
EU.  This is indeed a very-long term goal, and focuses on making a country reform its 
own institutions, which is the defining characteristic of the EU’s top-down approach to 
democracy promotion. 
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Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach 
Both the US bottom-up approach and the European top-down approach have 
strengths and weaknesses, and both are more suited to different stages of democracy 
promotion.  The US focus on elections and civil society generally make it best for 
bringing about a transition, whereas the long-term European integration model is best 
equipped to help with democratic consolidation.   
The US approach is rather unpredictable, short-term, and impersonal (Whitehead, 
1986).  Often a certain U.S. administration chooses a country to be its “showcase” 
democracy, for which it offers political and economic rewards for reform.  However, this 
reward often comes in the form of lump-sum payments, which only rewards short term 
behavior and holds no incentive for politicians and parties to fundamentally change their 
governance or the way they contest elections.  Because there is also no certainty that 
another administration will also support this country, this system lacks stability for 
domestic actors.  The multitude of actors and institutions, each with their own budget and 
objectives, also makes the US approach less “visible”, and runs the risk of considerable 
overlap. 
The fixation on holding elections can backfire if a country is not prepared to do 
so, and can produce counterproductive results.  Examples of this include US-backed 
elections in Lebanon in 2005, which brought US-labeled terrorist group Hezbollah to 
power, and similar results in the West Bank in 2006 with the victory of Hamas.  The ink-
stained fingers of Iraqis indicating their first election after the US invasion only serve as a 
sad reminder of this fact, as these elections have not brought stable democracy to the 
country.  Even if a country is ready to hold elections, democracy is more than just 
 18 
holding free and fair elections, which this policy neglects to consider (as Robert Dahl has 
stressed in his multiple works on polyarchy). 
The bottom-up approach seems best equipped in helping create a transition away 
from authoritarianism, because of its emphasis on a strong and educated civil society and 
strict rules for power change in elections.  However, in terms of helping a democracy 
consolidate, this does not seem as effective as the EU approach. 
The EU, with its strategy of enlargement and using conditionality to encourage 
long-term change and reform in a country, is more suited for a long term commitment to 
democracy rather than causing a transition. 
Its enlargement and now ENP program is one clear-cut program, which is 
transparent and based on mutual obligation- reform in exchange for incentives.  The ENP 
is tailored to each country’s needs, and progress is regularly reviewed with reports. 
However, this approach has a limited reach, as it only extends to reform-eager 
countries on its periphery (Belarus is excluded from ENP), and it has the most influence 
and effect on countries which are dependant on the EU’s security and economic policies 
(Bendiek, 2008, p.31).  Many doubt whether countries will be motivated enough to make 
reforms without the ultimate reward of membership (O’Donnell & Whiteman, 2007).  As 
withholding this ultimate carrot isn’t available to the ENP, the EU’s only recourse to deal 
with failure to reform is to “name and shame” them. 
In conclusion, the US approach, with its focus on elections and bottom-up civil 
society influences, is better designed for short term democratic gains such as revolutions.  
In contrast, the EU approach is better-equipped with helping a country consolidate their 
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democracy.  In Part II of this thesis, I will demonstrate that this has been the case in 
Ukraine as well.  But first, I will give a brief history of democracy’s progress in Ukraine. 
 
Overview of Ukraine since 1991 
Seventeen years after independence from the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s democratic 
progress is listed as undergoing consolidation (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2008).   
Ukraine seems now finally on the path to democracy after a short but difficult history 
which for a period of time even saw an increasing authoritarian tendency.  In this section, 
I will briefly sketch its democratic trajectory.  This will build a foundation for Part II, in 
which I will examine how the US and the EU have influenced Ukraine’s democracy.     
Ukraine was the first country to succeed from the Soviet Union, having declared 
its independence in December 1991 (Karatnycky, 2005).  However, this was not a 
“people’s revolution” as seen as in some east central European countries such as 
Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, but rather more typical of a 
“palace coup” regime change, which also occurred for example in Bulgaria and Romania, 
and in which many of the old elites were able to cling to power (Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, 2008). 
During the incumbency of Ukraine’s second president Leonid Kuchma (1994-
2005), Ukraine’s democracy regressed.  Corruption grew, and Kuchma dominated the 
semi-presidential system of government.  Especially during his second term, Ukraine saw 
an increasing tendency towards authoritarianism.  In the presidential election of 2004, 
Kuchma supported Viktor Yanukovych from the Party of Regions, who represented more 
the eastern and Russian-speaking part of Ukraine.  He was running against former prime 
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minister and economic reformer Viktor Yushchenko (Karatnycky, 2005), who led the 
Our Ukraine coalition.  Yushchenko was not only subjected to an election campaign 
which was almost universally criticized as unfair, he was also the victim of a poisoning 
which has left his face scarred (“Tests confirm Yushchenko,” 2006). 
Despite this, Yushchenko was shown to be leading in the exit polls, until election 
fraud ensured that Yanukovych was declared the winner.  This event sparked off what 
became known as the Orange Revolution, in which millions of ordinary Ukrainians 
protested in the streets, waving the orange banners of the Our Ukraine coalition.  
Seventeen days later, the Ukrainian supreme court annulled the election results.  New 
elections were held in December, after which Yushchenko was rightfully declared the 
third president of independent Ukraine.  He acknowledged the success of the people’s 
revolution by declaring, "We are free. The old era is over. We are a new country now” 
(Karatnycky, 2005). 
Since the Orange Revolution, however, Ukraine has been plagued by political 
turmoil, and is currently experiencing the break-down of its third government.  In 
September 2005, less than a year after Orange, Yushchenko dismissed the government 
headed by his former Orange ally, Yulia Tymoshenko.  He was then forced to form a 
coalition with former opponent Yanukovych, who then became prime minister.  After this 
government also failed, Tymoshenko became prime minister once again in December 
2007.  This reunion has also been strained, however, and public disputes as well as 
Tymoshenko’s obvious desire to run for president in 2010 led many to suspect that the 
government would be dismissed yet again.  Disagreement over Ukraine’s reaction to 
 21 
Russia’s military action against Georgia this summer was the final straw (“Timeline: 
Ukraine,” 2008).  New elections have officially been called for December of this year. 
Ukraine enjoyed special relations with both the US and the EU even before the 
Orange Revolution, although both have sought to deepen ties since.  Although an ENP 
plan for Ukraine was being negotiated even before the end of the Kuchma regime, it took 
on special urgency afterwards.  Ukraine was the first eastern European country to get an 
ENP plan from the EU (Fischer, 2008, p.2), and since 2007 there has been a new 
Enhanced Treaty for Ukraine with the ENP.  The first priority for the ENP in Ukraine 
was “further strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy and the rule of law” (European Commission, 2005).  
Some of the requirements for Ukraine are rather broad, while others are fairly 
specific, such as implementing recommendations from the “UN Committee of the Rights 
of the Child of 2002, as well as joining the Council of Europe Group of States Against 
Corruption (GRECO)” (Kelley, 2006, p.33).  For cooperation and reform, the EU is to 
offer “the possibility for Ukraine to participate progressively in key aspects of EU 
policies and programmes” (European Commission, 2005), such as an EU-Ukrainian free 
trade zone.    
In response to the colored revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, the US has pushed 
to bind these countries to the West as well.  It is doing so especially by pushing for their 
entry into NATO, which would bring their security under the transatlantic alliance.  I will 
discuss implications of Ukraine’s NATO bid in more depth in Part II. 
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In Part I, I have explained both US and EU approaches to democracy promotion, 
establishing that US efforts are better designed for bringing about a transition, while EU 
aid is better for longer-term consolidation of democracy.  I have also given a brief 
introduction to democracy in the Ukraine, which will serve as a foundation for in-depth 
analysis in Part II. 
  
 
 
 
II: Assessing US and EU Approaches 
 
Having thus far established the basic facts about US and EU democracy 
promotion efforts and Ukraine’s democratic history, I will now look how US and EU 
support has impacted Ukraine.  Is it correct to conclude that American support was more 
geared toward helping the Orange Revolution, and that the Europeans are doing more to 
help consolidate democratic gains there, or is this an oversimplified view?  In Part II, I 
will uncover exactly how the US and the EU have helped to aid democracy in the 
Ukraine, and at what stages they have done so. 
 
The Orange Revolution: a Triumph for American Democracy Promotion Alone? 
As many experts are quick to point out, the Orange Revolution in the winter of 
2004 was a triumph of the Ukrainian people, not the result of an outside coup and not the 
complete end effect of foreign aid, either.  However, there are external factors that 
contributed to the strengthening of certain opposition forces as well as to the weakening 
of the illiberal regime under President Kuchma.  Diplomatic pressure on the regime, as 
well as election-related activities and civil society efforts played a major role in the lead-
up to and during the Orange Revolution.  Although both the US and the EU were 
engaged in these efforts, the “United States was clearly the more active Western 
contributor to international efforts in Ukraine during the 2004 presidential election” 
(Sushko & Prystayko, 2006, p.134). 
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On the diplomatic level, both the Unites States and Europeans remained engaged 
with both sides before and during the revolution; however, the United States took a 
stronger tone and involved more of its “heavy-hitters” earlier in the game, and was 
willing to employ “sticks.”  In the run-up to the election, American policy heavyweights 
including Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke and Henry Kissinger all made clear 
statements warning the Kuchma administration against tampering with the votes.  On 
September 15, Congresswoman Dana Rohrabacher submitted a bill titled “Ukraine 
Democracy and the Election Act of 2004,” listing various sanctions if the elections did 
not go well (Sushko & Prystayko, 2006).  These included banning Ukrainian officials and 
family from traveling to the US, seizing their bank accounts and assets, and forbidding 
loans to them. 
As the crisis unfolded, the US employed high-level actors and issued stronger 
“sticks” in response.  President Bush personally wrote a letter to President Kuchma 
during the Revolution stating that the US would reconsider its relationship with Ukraine 
if the protests were not heeded, and he sent his personal representative Senator Richard 
Lugar to deliver the message (Sushko & Prystayko, 2006).  Secretary of State Colin 
Powell’s condemnation of the fraudulent vote was also read to the crowd to great 
applause (McFaul, 2007).  Powell made it clear that only a re-vote was acceptable, and 
that the crisis was jeopardizing US-Ukrainian relations. 
The EU played a more subdued diplomatic role in the run-up to and initial stages 
of the crisis.  In July 2004, the Commission noted that if the election did not go well, it 
might decide to bar it from the first round of ENP plans (Kelley, 2006, p.41).  However, 
this did not equal the forcefulness of US statements.   
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EU reaction was also split between the old members and the new Central 
European members.  The new members, such as Poland and the Baltic states, were 
immediately alarmed by the fraud and offered their support to the Ukrainian opposition 
(Sushko & Prystayko, 2006).  “Polish president Aleksandr Kwasniewski, who was 
working with a European Union delegation to mediate the crisis, also used his contacts 
with the regime to discourage the use of force” (McFaul, 2007, p. 71) as protestors 
gathered in the square.  Lech Walesa, the former Solidarity leader in Poland, assured the 
crowds that “the West was on their side” (McFaul, 2007, p.79). 
It was only near the end stage of the crisis that the EU dispatched high-ranking 
officials to mediate the crisis, at a time when the United States deliberately remained 
absent in order to minimize antagonism.  During the mediation among Kuchma, 
Yushchenko and Yanukovych, Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewski, Lithuanian 
president Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania and EU diplomatic chief Javier Solana were 
involved (McFaul, 2007).   
There were many factors by external actors that aided Ukrainians during the 
Orange Revolution, but these can generally be broken down into two components: aid to 
election-related activities and to civil society.   In this, the “United States also contributed 
more financial and technical support” (Sushko & Prystayko, 2006, p. 134).   
The US had contributed $18 million towards election-related activities in Ukraine 
from 2003-2004 (McFaul, 2007), while the EU spent only 1 million Euros for technical 
assistance in projects relating to elections (Kempe & Solonenko, 2005).  This included 
opposition training and exposure of election fraud.  A united opposition was a key 
element during Orange, and both the American IRI and NDI had devoted years of 
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training to all political parties in Ukraine.  They had also both increased the visibility and 
legitimacy of Yushchenko through their extensive contacts and networks.  Much of the 
technology and know-how used by domestic civil society organizations and NGOs to 
uncover election fraud was contributed by NDI and other American efforts (McFaul, 
2007). 
Civil society played an essential role during the revolution through the media and 
popular mobilization, which was indirectly supported by external actors.  Many members 
of the media which independently covered the campaign and protests had had extensive 
contact and had cooperated with American institutions, such as USAID and the National 
Endowment for Democracy.  Active civil society groups such as the youth organization 
Yellow Pora had been influenced by contacts with more experienced from other regions 
in Europe, which was facilitated by a number of Western organizations groups (McFaul, 
2007, p. 78).  They had also received training funded by USAID and other Western 
foundations. 
It is important to mention here that after the Orange Revolution, many questioned 
the nature of the US democracy promotion aid during the election.  Members of the US 
Congress, Russian officials, as well as some Ukrainian observers inquired whether “the 
$58 million the United States spent to promote democracy over the past two years was 
actually intended to oust the government there” (Brinkley, 2004).  Foreign governments 
are not permitted to fund partisan activities, and many were concerned that US aid 
focused on bringing Yushchenko to power or played too direct a role in the Orange 
Revolution.  However, none of these claims have ever been verified, and most experts 
(including Michael McFaul) insist that this was never the case (McFaul, 2007). 
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In this section, I have so far demonstrated that the US played a larger role in 
influencing Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.  However, I must also consider how much 
Ukraine’s desire to join the EU might have also played a role.  There is an obvious 
Western and EU orientation in Ukraine, which might have also restrained the hand of 
those trying to hold on to power at any cost.  This desire to one day join the EU might 
have ultimately helped the Orange Revolution.   
Although Ukraine has not been offered a membership perspective, Ukraine stills 
regards itself as a credible future member of the EU.  The EU has been careful to avoid 
using language that extends an explicit or too implicit membership, but instead has talked 
of partnership and cooperation.   
However, as Ukraine considers itself a possible future member of the EU, this 
desire could have contributed to some of the successful elements during the revolution.  
According to Dr. Vachudova, it is possible that through this desire, the EU was already 
able to exercise two types of leverage.   
The first is that that the pro-Western (Orange) forces were able to overcome their 
divided nature and unite on a “pro-West agenda.” This means that the possibility of one 
day joining the EU creates a “focal point for cooperation” (Vachudova, 2006, p. 31).  
This was displayed by the cooperation of the Orange bloc’s leaders and platforms for 
closer relations with the West.   
The second way in which prospective membership can affect countries pre-
breakthrough is by encouraging adaptation, or “adapting their political and economic 
agendas to come closer to satisfying the expectations of the EU and other international 
organizations” (Vachudova, 2006, p. 31).  Adaptation to EU standards probably occurred 
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on many levels, but one obvious sign is that Yushchenko, in negotiations with Kuchma 
and Yanukovych, agreed to make changes to the constitution which would make it more 
transparent and less dominated by the president (McFaul, 2007), thus bringing the 
constitution more in line with international and European standards. 
As I will reiterate in the next section, there is a consensus among the Ukrainian 
elite and population to increase ties with the West and join the European Union.  Because 
of the large potential economic and political benefits associated with joining the EU, no 
major political actor is against EU integration (Wolczuk, 2004).  This EU orientation 
played a role in avoiding bloodshed and overturning the fraudulent vote.   
However, the desire to join the EU must be regarded as a “guideline rather than a 
milestone” in achieving a democratic transition (Kempe & Solonenko, 2005, p. 17).  
Overall, the US was “the most active contributor to international efforts in Ukraine in 
terms of consistency, allocated assistance, and readiness to implement radical measures if 
democracy failed” (Sushko & Prystayko, 2006, p.141).  During the Orange Revolution, 
the US bottom-up approach did in fact contribute more to the democratic transition than 
the EU. 
 
Long-Term Stability and Consolidation: Is Only the EU Able to Make a Difference?  
In this section I will look at how the consolidation of Ukraine’s democracy has 
developed since the Orange Revolution, and how the US and EU approaches are 
assisting.  In order to do so, I will examine both actors’ political and economic relations 
with Ukraine, and consider views by elites and the population.  Because democratic 
consolidation would take years to complete, it is important to also assess which actor has 
 29 
the right methods to encourage further consolidation.  I will conclude that thus far, the 
EU is taking the lead in consolidation, but the US has played an almost equal role.  
However, I predict that this gap will continue to widen and that the EU will play the 
leading role in helping Ukraine consolidate its democracy in the future.  Assuming that 
the ENP Action Plans are followed through, and considering the challenges remaining for 
Ukraine’s consolidation, I will conclude that EU efforts will make more of an impact in 
the future. 
Politically, both the US and the EU exert political influence on Ukraine’s 
democracy, although generally the EU is able to exert more influence through its ENP 
program.  The US focuses on aiding civil society, and as I demonstrated in Part I, this 
played a large role in Ukraine’s democratic transition.  As this aid continues and civil 
society grows more robust, this will certainly help consolidate democracy.   
However, with its top-down approach, the ENP is able to exert more leverage.  It 
does this by requiring that Ukraine undertake very specific reforms in return for 
incentives.  In its action plan for Ukraine, there are six chapters covering a range of 
issues, from elections to company laws to nuclear waste.  This process basically requires 
Ukraine to adopt much of the acquis communitaire, which have helped other Eastern 
European states consolidate democracy and could ultimately make Ukraine’s entrance 
into the EU easier.  In order to adopt the reforms required by the action plan, a “Road 
Map on the Implementation of the AP” was drafted under Tymoshenko’s first 
government in 2005.  Later adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers, it lists 350 concrete 
measures which need to be implemented by certain deadlines (Wolczuk, 2008).  This 
process, although lacking some of the framework necessary to push through the reforms, 
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is an example of how the ENP requires countries to internalize their own reforms.  This is 
ultimately how the EU is able to exert more political leverage over Ukraine. 
Both the US and the EU are also helping to stabilize Ukraine’s democracy 
through economic relations.  They have both supported Ukraine’s WTO (World Treaty 
Organization) membership, promoted foreign direct investment in Ukraine, and have 
increased trade relations with Ukraine.  Due to its geographical location as the world’s 
largest market on Ukraine’s border, as well as its ENP program, the EU has a potentially 
bigger role to play. 
This year Ukraine finally became a member of the WTO, which is seen as a 
positive step towards increasing trade between Ukraine and the EU and US. This is also 
seen as a prerequisite step if Ukraine is ever to join the EU.  This step will not only 
increase Ukraine’s economic development, but it will also encourage even further 
reforms for Ukraine’s economy (Shumylo, 2006, p.4).  Both the United States and the 
European Union supported this important step for Ukraine. 
Foreign direct investment is an important economic support for Ukraine, and here 
the EU and US both play large and constructive roles.  “The EU is by far the largest 
foreign investor in Ukraine with its growing share every year (71.7% by the end of 2005). 
FDI flow from EU 25 amounted to €5.5 billion in 2006 compared to just above €230 
million in 2003” (European Commission, 2008).  The US also plays a large role here, in 
sixth place in terms of amount of FDI (Wolowski, 2008).  It seems likely that these trends 
will continue, and that FDI from both the EU and US will grow.  Newsletters for 
InvestUkraine, the promotion agency responsible for coordinating FDI into Ukraine, 
constantly lists programs and cooperation that the US and EU organize for them.  One 
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example is a recent tour organized for Ukrainian economic experts to visit Czech Invest.  
Czech Republic has been the most successful East European country attracting FDI, and 
this tour was sponsored by USAID. 
Trade with the EU has grown and will continue to anchor Ukraine’s position as a 
democracy with free markets.  “The enlarged EU has replaced Russia as Ukraine’s 
primary trade partner, accounting for 32.5% and 29.3% of its external trade share in 2003 
and 2004” (Shumylo, 2006, p.3).  A free trade zone is one of the goals of the ENP 
Enhanced Agreement, and in order to increase trade volume with the EU, Ukraine would 
require “progressive convergence to Internal Market rules, coupled with stepped-up 
consultation and cooperation, and an adaptation of institutional practices to EU 
standards” (Fantini & Dodini, 2005, p.64).   
Fantini and Dodini contend that countries completing the demanded reforms to 
join the EU could expect to see some of the large economic growth which has followed 
former enlargements.  Other countries undergoing the enlargement process have seen an 
average increase of 1.5% to 8% of GDP new members.  Fantini and Dodini generally 
conclude that “the ENP has a potential to foster economic growth in neighbouring 
countries” (2005, p.72). 
Although an important and growing trade partner for the Ukraine, the US cannot 
compare to the EU’s importance in this area.  It is also currently working on a free trade 
zone with Ukraine, but even if this would succeed, it would probably not require the 
same commitment to reform that the EU does.  Overall, I have demonstrated that the EU 
is in a better position to encourage democratic consolidation in Ukraine through its 
economic importance. 
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As I briefly mentioned in Part I, there is a strong consensus among Ukrainian 
political elites for European integration.  In fact, they are the driving force in the quest for 
EU membership (Wolczuk, 2004).  Ukraine was the first post-Soviet state to declare 
intention its of joining EU, and it has been the stated goal of every president of the 
Ukraine, including Kuchma.  This pursuit had a new sense of priority after Yushchenko’s 
election, and one of his first moves was to assign his close aid and former chief of staff, 
Oleh Rybachuk, to head up the important Ministry of European Integration. 
Before the implementation of the ENP agreement in 2004, Kataryna Wolczuk was 
convinced that Ukrainian elites had embraced EU membership publicly, but remained 
unwilling to undergo the high costs of Europeanization and reforming institutions and 
policies (Wolczuk, 2004).  Although she is skeptical whether or not the ENP is strong 
enough to cause reforms, she does claim that it has helped change the discourse about 
joining the EU.  She argues that the elites now seem aware that they will have to be 
willing to undertake major reforms.  They also understand that Europe means not just 
moderization and a better economic outlook, but that it includes norms, standards and 
values as well. 
It is clear that the Ukrainian political elites are united on one thing: the 
importance of joining the European Union.  If these elites are willing to undergo tough 
reforms in order to do so, this gives the EU room to insist that they adhere to the rules of 
democracy and eschew authoritarian tendencies. 
The leaders’ sentiments echo those of the population at large, which 
overwhelmingly support EU entry (Copsey, 2007).  In one 2003 survey, 93% of the 
Ukrainian population thought that entering the EU would be beneficial for Ukraine 
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(Wolczuk, 2008).  In the parliamentary elections in 2006, all major campaigns were for 
EU membership (Copsey, 2007), and the results demonstrated that people were unhappy 
with the slow pace of reforms, according to Kataryna Wolczuk (2006).  This indicates a 
readiness among the population for reform, and should give the elites permission to make 
steps towards the EU, including democracy reform. 
When considering how far Ukraine still has to go in its consolidation, the EU is in 
a position to exert more leverage for reform.  Pawal Wolowski suggests that Ukraine’s 
major impediment to consolidation is a weak state, which is caused by three factors.  
First, the legal system and constitution need to be reformed, which is evident yet again as 
Ukraine enters another constitutional crisis.  Secondly, the party system is out of touch 
with local voters, does not provide transparency or opportunities, and does not represent 
important issues.  Finally, there is a too-close link between politics and business, with 
many oligarchs playing a powerful role in politics, leading to wide-spread corruption 
(Wolowski, 2008). 
These obstacles must all be overcome by the Ukrainians themselves, but there are 
ways that both the EU and the US can assist, each playing to its own strengths and 
approach.  Although there is little either can do on the first issue, the EU could make an 
effort to insist that a new Ukrainian legal system should adhere to EU standards, so that it 
will be easier for it to integrate in the future.  In order to address the second issue, both 
the US and EU can play a hand in helping the party system develop.  Already NDI and 
IRI are involved in civil society programs in the Ukraine, and party development could 
become one of their explicit priorities.  German political foundations abroad (Friedrich 
Ebert and Böll Foundations, for example) could do the same.  In terms of the business-
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political ties, the US could target more of its money towards reducing corruption, with 
conditional aid for reaching benchmarks.  Its civil society programs could train in this as 
well.  The EU could add this to the ENP Enhanced Agreement, and also provide technical 
advice by bringing experts and bureaucrats to monitor this. 
In this section I considered what impact the US and the EU have had politically 
and economically on democratic consolidation in Ukraine.  I have also looked at the 
Ukrainian elites and population to determine how they view the European Union.  I have 
proved that the EU has played a marginally bigger role in consolidation so far, but I 
explained why I expect that the EU will soon take the lead, based on projections for the 
ENP’s success as well as the particular challenges facing Ukraine.  
 
Other Major External Actors in the Ukraine  
The United States and the European Union are not the only international actors 
who have influence on Ukrainian internal politics and goals.  In this section, I will focus 
on two other external actors which could influence democracy’s path in the Ukraine: the 
Russian Federation and NATO. 
The Russian Federation has a number of close ties to Ukraine.  In the section 
below I will address how these ties affect Ukrainian democracy, often constraining its 
democratic path.  Especially in light of this summer’s conflict between Georgia and 
Russia, many fear that Russia is looking to reassert its control over the former Soviet 
region, and that its next target is Ukraine.  I will argue that despite these negative 
influences and threats, these fears are exaggerated and that Ukraine is likely to continue 
to consolidation. 
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a political-military institution which 
offers security incentives for its members.  NATO expanded into east central Europe after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, and requires aspiring members to undergo some reforms in 
order to join.  Ukraine has applied for membership and is involved in some of NATO’s 
actions.  However, in light of low approval ratings in the population as well as recent 
tensions with Russia, it remains unclear when or if Ukraine will join the alliance, and 
whether it will have an impact on democracy.   
 
Russia  
Russia figures large into Ukrainian domestic politics, with substantial results on 
democracy there.  Russia influences Ukraine for a number of reasons: historical ties, a 
large number of Russian-speaking minorities and regions in the east, geographical 
proximity, energy security, economic influence and its engagement with the entire region.  
I will briefly review all of these influences here, to demonstrate how Russia does play a 
large role in Ukraine, and does so to the detriment of democracy.  Especially recent 
events on Russia’s behalf in breakaway regions of Georgia threaten peace and security in 
the region, as well as Ukrainian democracy.  However, I tentatively forecast that if the 
US and EU are able to manage the situation well and keep Ukraine on the right path, 
there is no reason that recent events should unravel democratic gains in Ukraine. 
Ukraine became a member of the Soviet Union in 1922, and during this era it 
played a vital role: it was known as the “breadbasket,” and it was also its heart of heavy 
industry.  When Ukraine declared independence in 1991, this officially signaled the 
break-up of the Soviet Union.  17.3% of Ukraine’s population is ethnically Russian, and 
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25% of the population is Russian-speaking (CIA World Factbook, 2008).  This is 
predominantly the case in the eastern half of the country which borders Russia.  This 
segment favors closer ties with Russia, and is deeply skeptical of NATO. 
“Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian presidential election in Oct and Nov 2004 
is widely viewed as the Kremlin’s greatest foreign relations blunder since 1991” (Sushko 
& Prystayko, 2006, p. 145).  In the run-up to the Orange Revolution, Russian president 
Vladimir Putin supported Viktor Yanukovych, who was Kuchma’s hand-picked 
successor.  When the fraudulent voter activities as well as with Moscow’s knowledge and 
support were exposed, Putin looked discredited.  “The problem is not that Kremlin 
gambled on a candidate who lost, but that the Kremlin’s involvement was so conspicuous 
and crude” (Sushko & Prystayko, 2006, p. 145).   
Putin struck against the democratic Orange government a few months after the 
election. Remarking that he wasn’t interested in providing the Orange forces with cheap 
gas, he demanded a drastic price increase from $50 per 1.000m3 to $250, the actual 
market price (Woehrel, 2008).  Until that point, the Ukraine had benefited from highly 
subsidized prices from Russia’s state-run Gazprom, which supplied 80% of Ukraine’s oil 
consumption and 78% of their gas consumption in 2004 (Woehrel, 2008).  When 
Yushchenko refused the price, Gazprom shut off supplies.  Ukraine is a major transit 
country for western Europe, and when Ukraine began to siphon off some of the supplies 
earmarked for western Europe, Gazprom was forced to end the blockade.  This event, 
right after the ascent of democratic rulers and in defiance of Putin’s support, 
demonstrates that Russia is unsettled by democratic movements in Ukraine, and that it is 
willing to act against such actions. 
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As I will describe in the next section, Russia does not approve of the prospect of 
Ukraine joining NATO.  It is not clearly opposed to its entry into the EU, as it views the 
EU as mostly an economic union.  However, it does offer some integration alternatives of 
its own to Ukraine, such as the Common Economic Space, which offers lower energy 
prices and reduced tariff barriers and includes Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 
(Wolczuk, 2004).  Russia holds also financial influence over Ukraine due to trade and 
investments considerations.  While these are not as large as US and European ties, they 
are nonetheless influential.  According to official data, Russia is the seventh largest 
foreign investor in Ukraine, and buys 25% of its products.  Ukraine imports 29% of all its 
products from Russia (Wolowski, 2008). 
All of these factors demand that Ukraine maintain good ties with Russia, and so 
Ukraine’s political leaders try to strike a balance between Russia and the West.  
However, recent events have threatened to unsettle this delicate balance.  In August 2008, 
the Russian military marched into parts of sovereign Georgia as a reaction to Georgia’s 
attacks on the separatist region South Ossetia, and sent ships there from its Black Sea 
Fleet, which is based in Sevastopol on Ukraine’s territory.  Ukraine, in response, declared 
that it was considering terminating its agreement with Russia over the use of the Crimea.  
When the US sent aid ships to this region, much of the Crimean population, including 
ethnic Russians and Muslim Tartars, became alarmed and began to protest for the 
independence of Crimea (Gee, 2008).  Many experts are concerned that violence and 
tension from the situation in Georgia will now spill over to Ukraine (Brüggman, 2008).  
Adding to the tension, President Yushchenko accused his Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko of siding with the Russians in this conflict.  This was the death-knell for 
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their fragile coalition government, which has now officially split up.  The entire situation 
lends credibility to suspicions that that Russia’s actions in this region are having a 
negative impact on Ukrainian democracy.  Many are even looking to Ukraine as the next 
conflict point with Russia.   
I believe, however, that this portrayal is too dramatic.  Instead of threatening 
Ukraine in an existential way, this summer’s actions have only stirred up tensions already 
brewing in the government coalition.  Well before this summer’s conflict in Georgia, the 
International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv predicted that the government would 
break up and snap elections would be called by the end of 2008 (International Centre for 
Policy Studies, 2008).  A piece in Time pointed out that “it was not manipulation on the 
part of Moscow that brought down the Yushchenko government.  The immediate threat 
comes from Yushchenko’s erstwhile key coalition partner” (Karon, 2008).  Anders 
Aslund from the Peterson Institute for International Economics argues that the coalition 
break was superficial because the coalition was already defective, and this opens up the 
possibility for a stabile coalition to take its place and continue to necessary constitutional 
reforms (Weikert, 2008).   
I argue that although Ukraine has not completed its democratic consolidation, it 
nonetheless is a solid democracy.  There is a deep consensus for a path to democracy, and 
no major political actors contest this.  According to the Bertelsmann Transformation 
index: “Occasionally, the political elite continues to play with the rules instead of by the 
rules. But they do not question democracy as such” (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 
2008, p.6).  Even listening to Yushchenko’s political opponents affirms this.  Viktor 
Yanukovych, Yushchenko’s opponent during the Orange Revolution, spoke of “the 
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irreversibility of democratic changes in Ukraine after the Orange revolution” on a trip to 
the US (“Visiting USA,” 2006).  Yulia Tymoshenko has also attested that Ukraine is now 
committed to a democratic and European future: “We are now immune to that illness 
(authoritarianism) …Today, I see Ukraine’s path...unequivocally in the direction of the 
creation of a real, European, democratic, rule-of-law state” (Freeland, 2008). 
Although the events of the past summer are indeed unsettling, there is no clear 
evidence that Ukraine’s democracy won’t remain on track, especially if the US and the 
EU maintain their steadfast support there.   
 
NATO  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is another international actor 
that is sometimes associated with democracy promotion, and in this section I will assess 
to what extent NATO is generally responsible for democracy promotion, and what kind 
of an impact it has on Ukraine.  I will demonstrate that NATO’s impact on Ukraine is 
currently rather weak, due to two factors.  First, Ukraine’s future entry into NATO is not 
entirely secure.  Although it is endorsed by the Ukrainian leaders, entry into NATO 
remains unpopular with the Ukrainian population and is unpopular with Russia.  
Secondly, NATO does not offer enough long-term incentives geared towards promoting 
democratic reforms. 
Although NATO has already absorbed many east central European countries 
which previously belonged to the Communist bloc, further expansion remains 
controversial.  Ukraine and Georgia, two countries which have in the past years seen 
“colored revolutions,” are pointing the way towards democracy and are officially striving 
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for NATO membership.  However, Russia has openly opposed this move, and in the face 
of its objection, France and Germany refused to back the entry of both countries at this 
year’s NATO Bucharest Summit.  However, the Alliance did send a strong message, 
stating that “that these countries will become members of NATO” (“US confident of 
NATO,” 2008). 
Entry into NATO is not only in doubt due to external concerns.  Whereas the 
desire to join the EU is widely embraced by the Ukrainian population and politicians, 
entry into NATO is more controversial.  According to February 2008 figures, a full 58% 
of the country is against entry, while merely 21% supports it (Umland, 2008).  This 
wariness of NATO is especially pronounced in the eastern and Russian-speaking parts of 
Ukraine.   
Even if NATO entry wasn’t contested, however, there is little evidence that 
NATO would be able to influence the development of democracy within Ukraine.  The 
NATO preamble calls for its members to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and 
civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, 
and the rule of law” (Whitehead, 1986, p.5).  However, NATO was historically a military 
alliance against the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact, and in its strategic interest it has not 
always insisted upon the democratic nature of its new members.  For example, whereas 
Portugal, Greece and Turkey were all forbidden entry into the EEC during their non-
democratic regimes, they were all accepted into NATO because of strategic military 
considerations (Whitehead, 1986).   
NATO does not seem to require a large commitment towards democracy.  
Although its Membership Action Plans require years of military and institutional reform 
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to complete, NATO “does not carry out systematic and regular monitoring” (Dimitrova & 
Pridham, 2004), and therefore lacks strong conditionality to spur democratic reforms.  
However, it is important to note that in the wake of 9/11, a new debate is being 
held on both sides of the Atlantic on expanding NATO’s missionary reach to include 
more democratic stipulations.  This debate could have a future impact on how much 
NATO emphasizes democracy in its members.  For the time being, however, NATO is 
unlikely to have a large democratic influence on Ukraine. 
 
As demonstrated in this section, the United States and the European Union remain 
the largest external supporters of democracy in Ukraine.  Ukraine is in a unique 
geopolitical situation between the West and Russia, and there are many external actors 
which influence Ukraine.  However, in regards to democracy, none of the other actors 
have as much influence as the US and the EU.   
Russia does factor largely into Ukrainian domestic politics and considerations, but 
its role in democratization is far from positive.  Russia does periodically play a role in 
destabilizing democracy in the Ukraine, such as during the Orange Revolution, as well as 
during the current crisis over separatist regions in Georgia.  This is something that the 
West must continue to take seriously and try to counterbalance.  Despite these negative 
influences, however, Ukrainian politicians and the population remain enthusiastic about 
joining the EU and the West, and as long as the US and the EU make efforts to continue 
on this path, a disruption in democracy due to Russian pressure can remain an unlikely 
development.   
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NATO is directly related to the Russia issue, as Russia seems determined not to 
lose Ukraine to this political-military alliance that has traditionally sought to counter 
Russia.  However, the very nature of NATO does not influence democracy per se, and 
even if Ukraine were offered a membership action plan, it would be unlikely to help 
consolidate democracy further.  Thus, the US and EU remain the most influential actors 
in regards to democracy in Ukraine. 
  
 
 
 
Conclusions and forecasts 
 
In the first part of this thesis, I explained how and why the US and European 
approaches to democracy promotion are different.  Due to a longer history associated 
with toppling regimes to bring about democracy, the US generally uses a bottom-up 
approach.  This focuses primarily on holding free and fair elections and helping civil 
society.  The EU, through its policy of enlargement, tends to use a top-down approach, 
where the incentive of becoming a member spurs the candidate country to undertake their 
own major democratic reforms.  Whereas the US approach is generally geared towards 
creating a revolution, the EU approach has become one of the best tools to encourage 
democratic consolidation in history. 
In the second part of this thesis, I examined whether or not these general 
guidelines pertain to the case study of Ukraine.  I demonstrated that during the Orange 
Revolution, the US overall played a stronger role through its election-related activities 
and civil society support.   With regards to aiding democratic consolidation, I argued that 
through the offer for deeper integration within the ENP program, the EU currently plays 
only a slightly larger role, although I predict this gap will widen as the ENP continues to 
shape Ukrainian policies. 
I also assessed the roles played in the Ukraine by two other actors- Russia and 
NATO.  Russia does sometimes have a negative impact on Ukrainian democracy, but 
because of its proximity, cultural and historic ties with Ukraine, as well as its energy and 
financial power in the region, Russia remains an important partner for Ukraine.  
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Therefore Ukraine must deal carefully with Russia, and cannot completely shake its 
influence.  The summer of 2008 saw a re-ignition of the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus 
region, and this has had repercussions for Ukraine.  However, the right reassurances by 
the West may assuage these fears, and Ukraine’s leaders should be able to move forward 
and put together a functioning government despite the recent events. 
Joining NATO is another current issue for Ukraine, but due to its unpopularity 
with Russia and with the domestic population, Ukraine is not likely to receive major 
support from NATO at this time.  Even if it were to receive a NATO membership bid, the 
nature of NATO’s accession process does not provide incentives for long-lasting 
democratic reforms.   
 
The US and the EU, therefore, remain the best chances for external influence on 
Ukraine’s democratic consolidation.  Although these partners have two very different 
approaches from the outset, they work together very well.  Because both actors have 
similar goals and interests in the region, their approaches are complementary.  For 
example, during the Orange Revolution, US and EU officials and institutions were in 
close contact with one another, and coordinated responses to the ongoing crisis.  Because 
US interference would have likely aggravated the situation, the US purposefully played a 
more behind-the-scenes while getting updates from European and EU public negotiators 
(Baun, 2008).  The US also realizes what a significant role the EU can play in Ukraine’s 
democratic consolidation by offering membership perspective, and are therefore openly 
supportive of Ukraine’s bid to join the EU (Baun, 2008).   
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That is not to say, however, that there are not points of tension between the US 
and EU democracy promotion efforts in this region.  Overall, the US favors bringing 
former Soviet countries such as Georgia and Ukraine into the transatlantic security fold, 
and more aggressively countering Russia’s influence.  The EU, while also hoping to 
stabilize Ukraine and supporting nations on its eastern border, is more cautious of 
evoking Moscow’s ire (Baun, 2008).  The Europeans remain acutely aware of Russia’s 
important role in energy security and in other global institutions such as the United 
Nations.  An example of US and EU approaches in conflict is the issue of offering NATO 
membership to Ukraine and Georgia.  However, the Americans and the Europeans are 
willing to compromise and cooperate: at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, no membership 
action plan was offered to these countries, but a joint issue securing their eventual entry 
was made.  It seems that US and EU officials both agree on the priority of democracy in 
Ukraine, and will coordinate efforts and policies to complement and compromise with 
one another. 
But improvements could be made in both current approaches.  The United States 
could make its aid more effective during the consolidation period by switching from a 
focus on elections to a focus on long-term commitments with some conditionality.  The 
US cannot realistically offer the same level of help that the EU could by offering 
membership, but it could still make its aid dependent on incremental and long-term 
reforms. 
The EU would do well to first raise the awareness of the ENP- according to some 
statistics, most people in Ukraine and even in Europe have never heard if it, and therefore 
it is very difficult for elites to convince the population that any difficult reforms will 
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actually pay off with a strengthening of ties to the EU (Lippert, 2008).  It could also 
perhaps set deadlines for benchmarks.  Currently, there are no specific deadlines for 
reforms or incentives within the action plans, and this could give added pressure to both 
sides to complete the objectives. 
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